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Abstract
This paper examines under what conditions it is justifiable that the government 
takes into account the demands of  protesters and whether the terms of  
procedural-equality in protest participation were met in the ‘Pots and Pans’ 
protests in Iceland in 2008–09. The protests were triggered by a financial 
melt-down in Iceland and did not come to an end until almost all the main 
demands of  the protesters had been met. The main conclusion is that due to the 
seriousness of  the issues which triggered the protests and that those issues were 
of  national concern, together with the large numbers of  protesters and wide 
support for their demands as well as extensive public discussion about the issues 
of  the protests, they were a prime example of  a situation when the authorities 
should consider taking the demands of  protesters into account. Furthermore, 
in this paper it is established that giving in to the demands of  the protesters was 
within the terms of  procedural-equality between the protesters and those who 
did not participate – adding to the justification that, in this case, it was justifiable 
to defer to the protesters’ demands.
Keywords: protest; protest participation; procedural-equality in participation; 
government responsiveness.
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Introduction
This paper analyses whether the authorities were justified in considering the demands 
of  those who actively engaged in the so-called ‘Pots and Pans’ protests in Iceland in 
2008–09 and did so without violating the terms of  procedural-equality in participation 
between those who protested and those who abstained. The ‘Pots and Pans’ protests 
were triggered by the collapse of  Iceland’s three major banks in the fall of  2008 in the 
wake of  the global credit crunch. Protests of  this scale and length of  time had not taken 
place in the history of  Icelandic democracy, a country with almost no tradition of  pro-
testing (e.g. Bernburg 2016) and are today, together with the financial collapse, referred 
to as landmark events in Iceland. The protests ended when the authorities gave into 
the main demands of  the protesters and resigned. Thus, the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests 
can, in those terms, be considered to have had an outcome desired by those who had 
actively engaged in the protests. However, of  importance is whether the outcome of  the 
protests was within the principles of  democracy in the sense that it was justifiable that 
the authorities took into account the protesters’ demands and did so without violating 
the conditions of  procedural-equality in participation – and these are the main research 
questions in this paper.
Beetham (2003) argues that there are five requirements for when political representa-
tives can be expected to take into account protesters’ demands instead of  their own de-
cisional autonomy, as follows: 1) the protest issue(s) should be of  major importance, 2) 
the issue(s) should be of  national concern, 3) a large number of  citizens should partici-
pate in the protests, 4) the demand(s) of  protesters should be supported by the general 
public and 5) extensive public discussion and scrutiny of  the protest issue(s) should have 
taken place. In this paper, the question as to whether these five requirements apply to the 
‘Pots and Pans’ protests in Iceland is examined. 
In addition to Beetham’s five conditions, the requirement of  procedural-equality be-
tween those who take part in and those who abstain from the protest is added as an 
important justification for the notion that the authorities are within democratic prin-
ciples to consider protesters’ demands. Based on the idea that political participation is 
a way for citizens to make their wishes and grievances known to the authorities and to 
make governments accountable and politicians responsive, Teorell et al. (2007) differen-
tiate between political equality as outcome-oriented equality and as procedural-oriented 
equality. The requirement of  outcome-oriented equality is that the political involvement 
of  citizens should have the purpose of  producing the most desirable result. Procedural-
oriented equality, hereafter referred to as procedural-equality, refers to the notion that 
all citizens should be treated equally regardless of  whether they take part in trying to 
influence the authorities. When it comes to political protest, procedural-equality means 
first that the authorities should not give into, or take into consideration, the demands 
of  protesters at the cost of  those who abstain from the protest. Second, procedural-
equality means that the terms of  participation should be just – that those who have the 
motivation to participate should not be inhibited from doing so due to lack of  resources 
for participation. This paper proceeds as follows. First is a discussion about Beetham’s 
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five conditions and whether they were met in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests in Iceland in 
2008–09. After this is a brief  discussion of  why people engage in political protests and 
in more detail the importance of  procedural-equality in protest-participation. Lastly, an 
analysis of  whether the principle of  procedural-equality was violated in the ‘Pots and 
Pans’ protests is presented, with a discussion at the end. 
1. Political protests and responsiveness of the authorities
Beetham (2003) raises the question: after the unprecedented mass demonstrations in the 
UK against going to war in Iraq what the proper relationship between political repre-
sentatives and organized public opinion should be and whether governments can simply 
ignore, at will, citizens’ demands that are channelled through mass demonstrations on 
a large scale. He bases this on the assumption that the mode of  decision making in 
contemporary democracies is changing, moving from the aristocratic principle to the 
democratic principle. In the aristocratic principle, representatives are not bound by their 
voters or the electorate at large, and representatives have no obligation to consult with 
citizens at all. The democratic principle is about the right of  every citizen to associate 
with others to influence their representatives in addition to voting for their preferred 
party or candidate every few years. As mentioned, Beetham argues that there are five 
conditions that apply to the issues or circumstances of  political protests where political 
representatives can be expected to defer, or at least take into consideration, the demands 
of  protesters, and these are as follows (p. 604):
1) The issue(s) should be of  major importance. A subjective criterion of  impor-
tance could be if  the issue motivates people to take action through protesting.
2) The issue(s) should be of  national importance and not merely represent a local 
or sectional interest. 
3) The campaign demonstration should involve large numbers.
4) The mobilization should be supported by a clear majority in public opinion polls, 
preferably over time. 
5) The issues should have been discussed extensively in a public debate. 
If  these five criteria are met, this provides grounds, according to Beetham, for elected 
representatives to take public opinion into account in their decision making. It might 
be argued that Beetham’s view is more in line with decision making in majoritarian de-
mocracies and is less useful as an analytical concept in other types of  democracies, such 
as proportional and/or consensual democracies. However, I consider these five criteria 
to be a useful starting point for analysing under what conditions it is justified, or even 
required, that the authorities take account of  public opinion. To these five requirements 
I add the importance of  the notion that the conditions of procedural-equality between 
protesters and abstainers should be met if  the authorities are to take into account public 
opinion. 
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1.1. The ‘Pots and Pans’ protests and responsiveness of the Icelandic authorities
The global credit crunch in 2008 hit the Icelandic economy hard, starting with the col-
lapse of  the country’s three major banks in October. Prior to the economic recession, 
the banking sector had grown to a size that was beyond the capability of  the Icelandic 
state to support. An example of  the over-sized banking sector is that in 2007, the bal-
ance sheet of  the three failed banks was nine-fold Iceland’s annual GDP. All three banks 
had big operations abroad but were insured, regulated and formally supervised by the 
Icelandic state (Danielsson & Zoega 2009). 
In the fall of  2008, the seriousness of  the situation soon started to reveal itself. For 
example, on 9 October, the British authorities used an anti-terror law to take control 
of  the Icelandic banks in the UK (Bloomberg 2008, Mason 2009), an act which was 
highly controversial but has never been legally contested. Landsbankinn, one of  the 
failed Icelandic banks, had offered the so-called Icesave deposits in the UK and in The 
Netherlands in the years before the economic crash. In the UK alone, Icesave depositors 
numbered approximately 300.000, which is a size similar to the Icelandic population. 
Following the crash, refunding the customers of  Icesave abroad was undertaken first by 
the British and the Dutch authorities. The terms of  the Icelandic state’s refunding of  
the money became a matter of  a diplomatic dispute between the Icelandic authorities 
and authorities in the UK and The Netherlands (Icenews 2011). The matter was finally 
settled by the EFTA court’s ruling in February 2013 in favour of  the Icelandic authori-
ties in regard to the terms of  the reimbursement (EFTA Surveillance Authority n.d.).
Önnudóttir and Harðarson (2011) point out examples of  the direct consequences of  
the recession: the currency restriction imposed in October 2008, rising unemployment, 
inflation and the need for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As 
early as October 2008, protesters started to gather outside the parliament, and their 
main demands were that the government should resign, an early election should be held, 
and that the board of  the Central Bank, together with the CEO and board of  directors 
of  the Icelandic Supervisory Authority, should resign. The protesters also demanded a 
revision of  the Icelandic Constitution, and this demand can be taken as a sign of  how 
the protest organizers managed to frame the protests as a need for democratic reform 
(Bernburg 2016). The over-sized failed banks, the financial melt-down, the currency re-
striction and the British authorities’ use of  an anti-terror law to freeze the assets of  the 
Icelandic banks in their country are clear demonstrations that the issues that triggered 
the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests were both major and national ones. Thus, Beetham’s first 
two requirements, that the protest issue(s) should be both major and concern the whole 
nation, are met. Even if  the demands of  the protesters can be narrowed down to the 
fact that they were demanding resignations, new elections and a revision of  the Consti-
tution, it is of  importance what triggered those demands – and those triggers were both 
major and national concerns. 
Indicators about the scale of  the protests and support can be found in the 2009 
Icelandic National Election Study (n.d.) (ICENES). Respondents were asked if  they had 
taken part in a protest after the bank collapse, and 16.8% of  them said that they had 
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done so. When asked if  they had supported or opposed the protests, 69.9% said they 
had supported the protests (very much/tended to support). Both the protest participa-
tion and support expressed for the protests are in line with what Bernburg (2016) finds 
in his research on participation in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests. Both ICENES data and 
Bernburg’s research show that Beetham’s (2003) requirements, that the protests should 
include a large number of  participants and be widely supported, are met. The length of  
the protests is here of  importance as well. Bernburg (2015) describes how the protests 
evolved, with the first protests organized immediately following the bank collapse in 
early October. Shortly after that, a series public meetings (both indoors and outdoors) 
started, where social critics, intellectuals and activists gave speeches about the situation. 
Önnudóttir and Harðarson (2011) describe how the government early on seemed intent 
on ignoring the protests; but as the weeks passed, the protests intensified in size and 
noise. After almost four months of  protesting, and some minor clashes between the 
protesters and the police, the government gave in and resigned at the end of  January 
2009. Shortly after that followed the resignations of  the heads of  the Central Bank and 
the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority, and an early election was scheduled and 
took place April 25, 2009.
The time that passed from the start of  the protests (early October 2008) until the 
government resigned (end of  January 2009) indicates that there was space for exten-
sive public discussion, and scrutiny of  the demands of  the protesters took place. Since 
then, there has been an ongoing debate and discussion about what went wrong in the 
Icelandic political and financial system (e.g. Bergmann 2014; Mixa 2009; Þórlindsson & 
Jónsson 2009; Special Investigation Commission 2010; Önnudóttir & Harðarson 2011) 
and about the consequences of  the recession (e.g. Önnudóttir et al. 2016; Einarsdót-
tir 2010; Oddsson 2010). While it is not clear whether and what role the Constitution 
played in the perceived failings of  the political system to prevent or mitigate the eco-
nomic collapse, the protests put the issue of  its revision on the agenda. Early in 2011, 
the parliament appointed 25 members to a Constitutional Council1, and in mid-summer 
2011 the Constitutional Council handed over a draft to the national parliament for a new 
constitution (Constitutional Council 2011). The parliament took the revisions under 
consideration but did not present a new draft before the 2013 national election – and 
the revision of  the Constitution is still an open question. 
It is clear from this short overview of  the financial melt-down in Iceland that ac-
cording to the circumstances of  the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests, Beetham’s (2003) five 
conditions that provide grounds for political representatives to consider and/or defer to 
public opinion are fulfilled. The protests were triggered by events that were both major 
ones and national ones. The protests involved large numbers and were supported by a 
clear majority of  the Icelandic population. The events that triggered the protests were at 
the time and have since then been discussed extensively in public debate. The Icelandic 
government did give in and resign, but it took almost four months of  protesting that 
escalated both in size and noise. 
Beetham’s five requirements indirectly touch upon the principle of  equality, which 
200 STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
The ‘Pots and Pans’ protests and 
requirements for responsiveness 
of the authorities
relates to the notion that the authorities should guarantee that the demands of  the 
protesters are not given into at the cost of  those who abstain. However, I do not con-
sider those five criteria to be sufficient, and procedural-equality in political participation 
should be more explicitly stated. Adding the requirement of  procedural-equality in pro-
test participation is based on whether the active public, those who protest, are represent-
ative of  the public at large (Teorell et al. 2007). Procedural-equality between those who 
participate and those who abstain is an important justification, in addition to Beetham’s 
five requirements, so that the authorities act according to the democratic principle when 
they account the demands of  protesters and do not do so at the cost of  those who ab-
stain. Moreover, procedural-equality also means that participation in protests should not 
be repressed due to lack of  resources people have for protest participation if  they have 
the motivation to take part. 
2. Protest participation and procedural-equality
Considerable research has been devoted to why people take part in protests (e.g. Teorell 
2006), possible feedback effects for participants in protests (e.g. Opp & Kittel 2009) and 
different motivations to protest depending on the issue of  the protests (Norris et al. 
2005). One piece of  the puzzle is why people invest time and other resources in partici-
pating in demonstrations as compared to low-cost activities such as signing a petition or 
boycotting. This is even more puzzling given the fact that the rewards are often scarce 
and that even if  the protesters demands are met, the results are often far from their 
expectations (Opp & Kittel 2009). 
When examining what factors can explain why people engage in political protest, a 
distinction must be made between macro-level factors and micro-level factors. On the 
individual (micro) level, it has been established that the active membership of  various 
organizations increases the likelihood of  taking part in political protests. Factors such 
as modernization, resources and opportunities to protest (macro) have been shown to 
explain cross-country differences in protest activity (Roller & Wessels 1996). The inter-
play between micro- and macro-level factors is of  importance, or, as Roller and Wes-
sels (1996) point out, individual-level activity is within the context and the flexibility 
of  political system to protest. Furthermore, the issue of  the protest is of  importance. 
Norris et.al. (2005) find in a study on protests in Belgium that different types of  issues 
mobilize different ideological groups of  protesters. Those who they label as new-left are 
more likely to participate in protests against globalization and racism and the old-lefts to 
participate in protests concerning social security. 
In distinguishing between three models of  democracy – participatory, responsive 
and deliberative democracy – they can be found to differ in their emphasis on the 
amount and type of  citizen participation (Teorell 2006). The responsive model requires 
a minimum of  participation of  citizens, such as by voting every few years. The participa-
tory model emphasizes participation beyond voting, and the deliberative model requires 
involvement in political discussion about policy decisions. Whether and to what extent 
citizens value different types of  democracy is often discussed in terms of  how policy 
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decisions are arrived at and whose interest should be kept in mind when making those 
decisions – and are, as such, outcome-oriented. For political decisions to be fair and just, 
the decisions taken, or the outcomes, must be within the terms of  outcome-oriented 
equality. This means that the ‘best’ decision is taken, a decision that is fair in terms of  
both how it is arrived at and in terms of  whom or what groups it concerns. 
However, as Teorell (2006) points out, to understand why people participate in poli-
tics, including protests, in addition to outcome-oriented equality, procedural-equality is 
of  importance as well. Procedural-equality means that the terms of  participation should 
be fair. Focusing on protest participation, the principle of  procedural-equality concerns 
whether the terms of  participation are equal between protesters and abstainers. Pro-
cedural-equality in the context of  participation in protests is defined by Teorell et al. 
(2007) as the notion that every citizen should have the same opportunity to be politically 
involved if  he or she chooses to be so. If  people have the motivation to participate but 
their participation is repressed due to lack of  resources or capacitating factors they can 
draw from for their participation, this violates the terms of  procedural-equality. This 
also means that if  people are politically involved because of  their motivations and/
or ambition to be so, and not only because they have the capability to participate, their 
participation adheres to terms of  fairness in political participation or, in other words, to 
terms of  procedural-equality in participation.
Teorell’s (2006) distinction between the resources people have for participation and 
their motivation to participate is of  importance (see also Teorell et al. 2007). Resources, 
also referred to as capacitating factors, are about the factors enabling participation, while 
motivation is about whether people have the ambition to or want to participate. Teorell 
divides resources for participation into physical, human and social capital. Physical capi-
tal refers to material assets, such as an individual’s income, wealth and even free time. 
Human capital is about human skills and enabling factors such as education, political 
knowledge and political efficacy. The more educated one is, the greater knowledge one 
has about politics; and the greater sense of  political efficacy one has, the more resources 
one has in terms of  human capital for political participation. Social capital refers to how 
involved people are in social networks; and the more involved one is, the more likely one 
is to be engaged in politics. It is acknowledged that these three types of  capital can and 
do overlap, but the distinction is useful in the sense that it draws attention to the fact that 
citizens can have low resources in one type of  capital, but they can make up for this by 
having higher resources in other types of  capital. 
Motivation to participate in protests is in its simplest form is whether or not people 
have a desire to participate. According to Teorell et al. (2007), the motivation to act is a 
function of  each individual’s perceived stake in the issue at hand. This can, for example, 
be his or her dissatisfaction with how the political system works. Motivation can also be 
driven by factors such as ideological attachment and a civic duty to take part. Teorell et 
al. (2007) make the point that information and information cost are important factors 
for motivation to act and that political interest, frequency of  discussing politics with 
others and media exposure to political content are all factors that decrease information 
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cost. However it can also be argued that information and information cost are resources 
for participation, not only incentives. These can reflect both a motivation and a resource 
for participation in the sense that the more informed one is, the less time one has to 
invest in becoming informed and is, as such, a resource for participation – and the in-
formation itself  can feed into a motivation to take part in protests. Also, as pointed out 
by Teorell (2006), resources can have an impact on incentives to participate in terms of  
the idea that those who are low on resources feel less motivated, because it is too costly 
for them. Or, it could be the other way around: those who are motivated to participate 
do invest in resources for participation (e.g. time and information). However, of  analyti-
cal importance for the terms procedural-equality in participation is that all citizens have 
equal resources to be politically involved regardless of  whether or not they participate. 
While it is also of  importance to understand the relation between resources and incen-
tives, that is set aside in this paper for future consideration. In this paper, the focus is 
on comparing participants and abstainers in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests in terms of  
procedural-equality – as a crucial requirement and an addition to Beetham’s (2003) five 
criteria discussed earlier in this paper – as an indicator that the authorities were justified 
in giving in to the main demands of  the protest participants. The terms of  procedural-
equality mean that it is of  importance that those who have the motivation to act are not 
inhibited due to their lack of  resources. Moreover, protest participants should not be 
able to impose their will against the abstainers’ wishes simply because they have more 
resources to protest. Even more important is that if  abstainers from the protests have 
a stronger motivation to participate when compared to participants but are lower on 
resources for participation, this violates the terms of  procedural-equality in participation 
– and this part I test directly here and hypothesize the following: 
H1: If  people had the motivation to participate in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests, 
low resources for participation did not prevent them from participating. 
2.1. Procedural-equality in participation in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests 
To analyse whether the requirement of  procedural-equality in political participation was 
met in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests, I use data from ICENES 2009 and run a binary 
logistic regression analysis. The response variable is whether or not respondents par-
ticipated in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests2. Those who took part in the ‘Pots and Pans’ 
protests are assigned the value of  1 and are contrasted with those who abstained, which 
are coded with a 0.
Explanatory variables are divided into motivational and capacitating (resources) fac-
tors, and my indicators are partly based on those Teorell et al. (2007) use in their analy-
sis on procedural-equality in political participation. For motivational factors, I consider 
citizens’ stake in the issues to be the major factor in mobilizing them to protest. Dis-
satisfaction with how democracy works3 and the blame they assigned to the incumbent 
government for the crisis4 are used as indicators of  citizens’ stake in the issues of  the 
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protests. The more dissatisfied they are and the more they blamed the government, the 
more their motivation to take action should increase. 
The most obvious form of  physical capital as a resource is respondents’ income, and 
for those purposes I use a question about their household’s income5. For better consist-
ency with other explanatory and control variables, household income is rescaled to a 
scale from 0 (lowest income) to 1 (highest income). Respondents’ experience of  working 
together with other people who share a similar concern can be taken both as a source 
for human capital, as Teorell et al. (2007) do, and as a form of  social capital (e.g. Putnam 
2000). Regardless of  whether respondents’ experience of  working together with other 
people is a form of  social or human capital, it can be taken as a capacitating factor for 
political participation. The more people have of  such experience, the more socialized 
people are in participating in collective action. For this I use a question about whether 
the respondents have worked together with people who shared similar concerns over the 
last five years6. Education can be considered a capacitating factor, and it has been shown 
to have a strong link with political internal efficacy (Morris 2003), which are citizens’ 
beliefs that their participation in politics is important and that by it they can accomplish 
things in politics. Thus, education can enhance the perceived capability to act and the 
belief  that participation in protests is of  importance, whether it is taken as merely a civic 
duty to do so or as a perception that participation will put pressure on the authorities to 
respond to the protesters’ demands. 
For the terms of  procedural-equality to be met, peoples’ resources for participation 
should not prevent them from participating if  they have the motivation to take part. 
This means that motivation should predict participation, not the resources respondents 
can draw from for their participation. Moreover, the terms of  procedural-equality in 
participation mean that motivation for participation should not be a sole function of  
peoples’ resources for participation. To test whether the effect of  motivation to partici-
pate in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests depends on resources for participation, I include 
interaction terms between those variables measuring motivation to take part (dissatisfac-
tion with how democracy works and blame assigned to the incumbent government) and 
respondents’ resources (income, worked with other people who share a similar concern 
and education). 
Eight additional factors are controlled for, including political interest; ideological 
placement on left–right; whether the respondent voted and whether he or she voted for 
one of  the incumbent government parties in the 2007 election; whether or not they live 
in the capital area; and their gender, age, marital status and number of  children living in 
their household – and each are discussed here briefly. 
The more interested people are in politics, the more informed they already are, and 
thus their information cost is lower (e.g. Teorell et al. 2007). Low information cost can 
be considered a resource one can draw on for his or her participation, and the infor-
mation itself  can act as a motivation factor for participation. Of  importance for the 
purpose of  this paper is that political interest is an important factor when it comes to 
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lowering information cost, and it has been established that those who express higher 
interest in politics are also more likely to take part in protests (Martin & van Deth 2007). 
Regardless of  whether political interest reflects a resource, a motivation or a mix of  
both, it is an important factor to control for when analysing protest participation. This 
is, among other things, to prevent possible bias when estimating peoples’ motivation to 
participate and so that this motivation is not driven solely by the fact that they are more 
interested in politics. 
Ideological placement has been shown to be of  importance in protest behaviour, 
together with the issue of  the protest. Those who are left-leaning have been shown to be 
in general more likely to protest (e.g. Bernburg 2015; Teorell et al. 2007). Given that the 
‘Pots and Pans’ protests were against a government led by a right-wing party (a coalition 
of  a right-wing party and a centre-left party) and that it could be argued that the issue of  
the protests concerned economic security, it can be assumed that left-wing voters had 
a stronger motivation to take part in the protests. To control for this, I use an indicator 
about respondents’ left–right self-placement7.
As a control, the ‘home-team’ argument is also relevant. The ‘home-team’ effect 
refers to when voters of  government parties express more satisfaction with how de-
mocracy works and support for the government, simply because the party they voted for 
is in government (e.g. Anderson & Mendes 2005; Holmberg 1999). It could be argued 
that if  the only thing that distinguishes between protesters and abstainers is whether or 
not they voted for one of  the government parties, the protests would be a manifesta-
tion of  the ‘usual’ political debate between the opposition and the government. For 
these reasons, both as a motivation to participate and as a control for support for the 
government, I add a variable that indicates whether the respondent voted for one of  the 
incumbent government parties at the time of  the protests (Independence Party or Social 
Democratic Alliance).
I also control for whether or not respondents voted. A little under 10% (9.8%) of  
respondents in ICENES reported that they did not vote. As we do not know whether 
they would have voted for the government or the opposition, their electoral participa-
tion needs to be controlled for, and for that a dummy is used which indicates whether 
or not they voted in the 2007 election. Residency is a capacitating factor in the sense 
that it has an obvious link to the opportunity citizens had to take part in the protests. 
The major bulk of  the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests took place in front of  the parliament 
in Reykjavik, the capital of  Iceland. This means that those living away from the capital 
area did not have the same opportunity to participate as those living within the capital 
area due to the inconvenience of  having to travel to the city to become actively involved. 
Considering age, the youngest and the oldest are least likely to protest (e.g. Teorell et 
al. 2007; Norris 2005) and thus I control for age8 and age squared, with the latter esti-
mating a curvilinear effect. By adding age as a control factor, I lower the risk of  bias due 
to the possibility that the motivational and capacitating factors of  interest are biased be-
cause of  their relation with age (for example, household income and education). Earlier 
research has established that females are less likely to protest (e.g. Dalton 2002), and thus 
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I control for respondents’ gender9 (male or not). Furthermore, as I use respondents’ 
household income as a capacitation factor, the number of  children10 in the household 
are controlled for, together with respondents’ marital status11 (household income does 
not distinguish between whether there is one salary earner and how many dependents 
there are in the household). 
Table 1 presents the results of  a binary logistic regression comparing the effect of  
motivational and capacitating factors on protest behaviour. I present five models. The 
first model incorporates only the control variables and the second and third models the 
variables which are of  main interest in this paper – first the capacitating factors and next 
the motivational factors. In the fourth and fifth models, I introduce the interaction vari-
ables, testing whether participation in the protests for those respondents who had the 
motivation to take part was repressed by their lack of  resources for participation. This I 
do first for dissatisfaction with how democracy works and second for how much blame 
respondents assigned to the incumbent government for the economic crisis. I will focus 
my discussion on the latter three models but would like to note that when adding the 
capacitating factors in model 2, those factors have a negligible effect on protest partici-
pation, as they do also in model 3. However, in models 4 and 5, household income and 
the interactions between income and motivation to take part are statistically significant, 
with a p-value lover than .1. I will now turn the discussion to the main results in models 
3, 4 and 5.
Considering first the control variables, it is not a surprise to find that those who 
participated are more interested in politics, more left-wing and more likely to live in the 
capital area. Those who voted in the previous election are less likely to have participated 
in the protests, and this might reflect a distinction between conventional political partici-
pation, such as voting, and ‘unconventional’ participation, such as protesting. The effect 
of  the ‘home-team’ argument, which is that those who voted for one of  the incumbent 
parties in the previous election should be less likely to have participated is negative, 
supporting the argument. However, this effect is not strong enough to be statistically 
significant in models 3 and 4. The direction of  the effect of  electoral participation and 
to have voted for one of  the incumbent government parties indicates that in the ‘Pots 
and Pans’ protests the electoral support of  the incumbent government could have been 
in part a mobilizing factor for protest participation – and underscores the importance 
of  controlling for those factors.
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Table 1. Participation and support for the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
B B B B B
(std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.)
Intercept -4.21*** -3.48** -5.30*** -.5.25*** -5.80***
(.877) (1.010) (1.177) (1.381) (1.615)
Motivational factors
Dissatisfaction with how democracy works (4 point scale, 
1=very satisfied, 4=not at all satisfied)
.40** .44+ .43**
(.134) (.265) (.135)
The government’s responsibility for the economic crisis (11 
point scale, 0=no responsibility, 10=a much responsibility)
.18** .17* .22
(.065) (.066) (.146)
Capacitating factors
Household income (ISK, rescaled to 0 (lowest income) to 1 
(highest income))
1,28 1,50 9.41+ -23.07+
(.1.400) (1.440) (5.521) (.12.855)
Worked together with people who share similar concerns 
(1=yes, 0=no)
-.12 -.04 -.66 1.20
(.236) (.242) (.892) (1.106)
Education, reference group=primary education
Secondary education -.25 -.14 -.58 .45
(.314) (.325) (1.221) (1.676)
Vocational education -.27 -.20 -.08 .10
(.330) (.335) (1.252) (1.685)
University education .00 ,12 -.16 1.15
(.273) (.283) (.993) (1.524)
Interaction variables
Dissatisfaction with democracy*household income -3.35+
(1.997)
Dissatisfaction with democracy*worked together with 
people who share similar concerns
.23
(.296)
Dissatisfaction with democracy*secondary education .15
(.412)
Dissatisfaction with democracy*vocational education -.05
(.409)
Dissatisfication with democracy*university education .10
(.336)
Government’s responsibility*household income 2.85+
(1.451)
Government’s responsibility*worked together with people 
who share similar concerns
-.15
(.129)
Government’s responsibility*secondary education -07
(.193)
Government’s responsibility*vocational education -.14
(.190)
Government’s responsibility*university education -.11
(.172)
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,…table 1 continued.
In regard to one of  the main concerns in this paper, I find for citizens’ stake in the issue 
in models 3 and 4 that those who express greater dissatisfaction with how democracy 
works are more likely to have participated in the protests. Model 3 also shows that the 
more the respondents blame the government for the economic crisis, the more likely 
they are to have participated in the protests. However, when interacting blame with 
household income, which is one of  the resources respondents can draw on for their 
participation, the effect of  blame on participation becomes negligible, whereas house-
hold income becomes significant as well as the interaction between income and blame. A 
similar pattern is found for dissatisfaction with how democracy works; when interacting 
it with household income in model 4, the main effect of  dissatisfaction becomes weaker 
(but is still statistically significant), and both the interaction term with household income 
and the main effect of  household income are significant. Before examining these inter-
action effects graphically, it should be noted that all other interaction terms in models 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
B B B B B
(std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.) (std.err.)
Control variables
Political interest (5 point scale, 1=none, 5=very great) .70*** .76*** .72*** .70*** .74***
(.099) (.121) (.124) (.125) (.364)
Left-right self-placement (11 point scale, 0=left, 10=right) -.27*** -.24*** -.22*** -.23*** -.22***
(.046) -,052 (.054) (.054) (.054)
Voted for the previous incumbent party (1=yes, 0=no)1 -.34+ -.49* -.37 -.37 -.39+
(.200) (.231) (.237) (.240) (.239)
Voted in the previous election (1=yes, 0=no) -.68* -.71* -.76* -.81* -.77*
(.323) (.352) (.360) (.364) (.363)
Lives in the capital area (1=yes, 0=no) 1.75*** 1.65*** 1.63*** 1.66*** 1.67***
(.231) (.260) (.268) (.272) (.273)
Male (1=yes, 0=no) .23 .02 -.06 -.08 -.04
(.180) (.215) (.221) (.224) (.223)
Age .08+ .05 #REF! .02 .02
(.041) (.047) (.049) (.050) (.050)
Age squared -.001* -.001+ -.00 -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Married or living as married (1=yes, 0=no) -.24 -.25 -.17 -.09 -.13
(.209) (.228) (.237) (.242) (.238)
Number of children, 17 or younger, living in household .01 -.04 #REF! -.04 -.04
(.097) (.112) (.114) (.116) (.115)
N 1105 891 853 853 853
Maximum Likelihood R square ,17 ,17 ,19 ,20 ,20
Cragg & Uhler’s (Nagelkerke) R square ,28 .29 ,31 ,32 ,32
Note: Response variable is protest participation (1=particpated, 0=did not participate).  
Significance levels are +p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01 and ***p<.001.
1 The government coalition of the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Alliance.
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4 and 5 are not statistically significant. This indicates that protest participation is not 
repressed among those who have the motivation to participate due to lack of  resources 
in terms of  their experience in working together with other people who share similar 
concerns and their education level. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the marginal effects of  citizens’ stake in the issue, dissatisfac-
tion with how democracy works and how much responsibility respondents assigned to 
the government for the crisis12, and how the effect of  those on participation interact 
with household income13. Focusing first on dissatisfaction with how democracy works 
in Figure 1, the general trend is that those who are more dissatisfied are more likely to 
have participated. But there is a difference in protest participation depending on house-
hold income, which is that income has a stronger effect on participation among those 
who express the most dissatisfaction (not at all satisfied) when compared to those who 
are less dissatisfied. The difference in probabilities to have participated in the protests 
between respondents in the lowest and highest quintile among those who were not at 
all satisfied with how democracy works is .09, where higher-income voters are more 
likely to have participated, with a margin of  .30, compared to low household income 
respondents, with a margin of  .21. The difference between the same income groups 
among those who were very satisfied is much smaller, or .04 (high household income 
respondents are slightly more likely to have participated). 
Figure 1. Marginal effects of dissatisfaction with how democracy works, household 
income and protest participation – calculated based on model 4 in Table 1.
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Interestingly, the interaction effect between household income and the responsibility 
the respondents assign to the former government for the crisis is reversed. The general 
trend is still (but not significant) that the more the government was blamed for the crisis, 
the higher the probability that respondents took part in the protest – and household 
income still has a stronger impact among those who assigned more responsibility com-
pared to those who blamed the government less. The difference is that, when compared 
to dissatisfaction with how democracy works, low household income respondents are 
those who are more likely to have participated in the protest compared to high house-
hold income respondents, after controlling for how much they blamed the government 
for the crisis. Furthermore, those differences are bigger the more the government was 
blamed for the crisis. Among those who assign much responsibility (+.5 st. dev. above 
the mean) to the government for the crisis, the difference between the lowest and high-
est income groups in probability to have participated is .19, where low household in-
come respondents are more likely to have participated, with a margin of  .31, whereas 
high household income respondents have a margin of  .12. The difference between the 
same income groups among those who assign low responsibility to the government for 
the crisis (-.1.5 st. dev. below the mean) is .12, where low household income respondents 
are still more likely to have participated. 
Figure 2. Marginal effects of the government’s perceived responsibility for the 
bank crisis, household income and protest participation, calculated from model 
5 in Table 1.
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The reason for the reversed interaction effects between, on one hand, household in-
come and, on the other hand, dissatisfaction with democracy and blame assigned to 
the government can only be suggested here. It could be that there are partly different 
reasons that drive motivation between high and low household income respondents; 
for example, high income respondents are less likely to target the government as the 
culprit for the economic crisis and more likely to blame the democratic system, whereas 
for low-income voters this is reversed (they target the government to a greater extent 
and the democratic system to a lesser extent). However, what can be argued is that these 
differences in the interaction effects indicate that the two motivation factors used in the 
models presented in this paper do partly reflect different motivations to participate in 
the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests. 
3. Discussion
Using Beetham’s (2003) five criteria for when the authorities should consider to defer to 
the demands of  protesters – that the issue(s) should be of  major importance, that the 
issue(s) should be of  national concern, that the number of  protest participants should be 
high, that their demands should be supported by the general public, and that the protest 
issue(s) should have been scrutinized in public debate – I show that those conditions were 
all met in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests. Moreover, I add the criterion that the terms of  
procedural-equality in protest participation should be met as a necessary justification for 
when it is justifiable that the government defers to the demands of  protesters. The terms 
of  procedural-equality in protest participation are important to prevent a situation where 
the protesters’ can force their demands to be taken into consideration against the wishes 
and interests of  those who do not participate in the protests if  participation were to be 
solely be driven by resources for participation. This part of  the terms procedural-equality 
coincides directly with Beetham’s requirement, that the protest issue(s) should be sup-
ported by the general public. Moreover, the terms of  procedural-equality are violated if  
the abstainers have a stronger motivation than participants to participate but are inhibited 
to take part due to their lack of  resources. In this paper, I have established that the condi-
tions of  procedural-equality between participants and abstainers in the ‘Pots and Pans’ 
protests were indeed met – and this together with Beetham’s five requirements indicates 
that the authorities justified in giving in to the main demands of  the protester participants.
Of  importance for the terms of  procedural-equality in political participation is that 
the main difference between those who are active and those who abstain should be first 
and foremost be viewed in terms of  motivational factors, not the resources they have to 
participate. Examining the differences in capacitating factors between participants and 
abstainers in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests, such as in their experience in working with 
other people who share similar concerns and education, there are no signs that the par-
ticipants differ from abstainers when it comes to the resources they can draw upon to be 
actively involved. Protest participants did not have more human and/or social capital in 
terms of  being better educated or of  having had more practice in using civic skills when 
compared to abstainers. 
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When it comes to physical capital, respondents’ household income does seem to 
have an effect on participation when interacted with dissatisfaction with how democracy 
works and the blame respondents assign to the government for the crisis – but those 
interaction effects are still within the terms of  procedural-equality for two reasons. First, 
in the case of  dissatisfaction with how democracy works, high household income seems 
to accelerate the probability for participation the more dissatisfied one is. Because the 
main effect of  dissatisfaction with democracy is still positive, this means that motiva-
tion still drives participation. Thus household income seems to heighten participation. 
However, due to the finding that among those who have low household income, those 
who are more dissatisfied are more likely to have participated compared to those who 
are less dissatisfied – participation is still within the terms of  procedural-equality. The 
terms of  procedural-equality would have been violated if  low household income were 
to have been accompanied with a stronger motivation to participate when compared 
to those with high household income. Second, in the case of  the blame assigned to the 
government for the crisis, the interaction is reversed. In this case, stronger motivation 
to take part in terms of  how much the government is blamed has a stronger effect on 
low household income voters, which are also more likely to have participated, when 
compared to high household income voters. This means that even if  high house-income 
has a stronger effect when it comes to dissatisfaction with how democracy works as 
a motivation to participate, the reverse interaction between income and the blame as-
signed to the government, where the blame is a stronger mover of  low income voters, 
indicates that the differences between household income groups balance each other out 
depending on which motivation is focused upon. Thus it can be argued that my results 
indicate that in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests, the terms of  procedural-equality were not 
violated – that inequality in resources did not prevent participation among those who 
had the motivation to participate. 
Even though the data used in this analysis were gathered after the ‘Pots and Pans’ 
protests took place (but still within eight months since the end of  January 2009 when 
the government resigned), it is not a plausible assumption that the protests created 
procedural-equality in terms of  protest participation. The protests can possibly have 
intensified the motivational factors, but I assume that participants were motivated to 
protest from the start. The ‘Pots and Pans’ protests can probably be considered an ex-
ception in the sense that it was a rare type of  circumstances that made it justifiable for 
the authorities to give in to the protesters’ demands. In this sense these protests can be 
considered to have been effective, as all the main demands of  the protesters were met, 
even if  results were not as revolutionary as some protest organizers might have liked. 
The government was held accountable and resigned, an early election was called and the 
directors of  the two main financial regulatory institutions – the Central Bank and the 
Financial Supervisory Authority – also resigned. Even if  it is true that the government 
could not have prevented the economic recession, it was still blamed for how severely it 
hit Iceland, echoing Kayser’s (2005) point that there are numerous examples that voters 
hold politicians accountable for events that are beyond their control “… that they can 
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at best mitigate but cannot prevent” (pp. 21–22). Moving the focus away from the ‘Pots 
and Pans’ protests to protests in general, there are reasons to believe that protests similar 
to the ‘Pots and Pans’, which fulfil the requirements that make it justifiable for govern-
ments to consider to defer to the demonstrators’ demands, are rare. 
In this paper, I have demonstrated that the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests were well within 
the framework of  democratic principles, and I have established the importance of  tak-
ing into account the terms of  procedural-equality in protest participation. A research 
topic that can be developed from that presented here is how participation and wide-
spread support for major protests such as the ‘Pots and Pans’ can add to citizens’ learn-
ing experience in political participation, especially if  the feedback effects are positive. 
Whether the authorities should consider taking account of  demands of  those who ac-
tively participate should depend on, among other things, the nature and the scope of  
the issue, that extensive public discussion about the protest issues have taken place, that 
the protesters’ demands are supported by the general public and that participation in the 
protests is first and foremost driven by a motivation to take part, which is not repressed 
due to a lack of  resources people can draw upon for their participation. 
Notes
1 Those same 25 members of  the Constitutional Council had been elected to the Council in the fall 
of  2010. The election was invalidated by the Supreme Court on 25 January 2011 due to technicalities 
in how the election was carried out. The parliament decided on 24 March 2011 to appoint the 25 
elected candidates to the Constitutional Council. 
2 The question about participation in the ‘Pots and Pans’ protests – ‘But have you done so after the 
bank collapse last October?’ – was a follow-up question from ‘Over the past five years or so, have 
you taken part in a protest or a march?’. In both questions, the response categories were either yes 
or no. In this paper, I use respondents’ replies to the question about whether they have participated 
after the bank collapse in October’.
3 Question asked: ‘On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in Iceland?’
4 Question asked: ‘Various agents have been mentioned as being responsible for the bank collapse 
and the economic crisis that followed. Now I will name a few of  them and ask you to give each of  
them a number from 0 to 10, where 0 means that the agent in question did not bear any responsibil-
ity at all and 10 that the agent in question bears very great responsibility. Where would you place...
the Government of  Geir H. Haarde?’.
5 Question asked: ‘What was your/your and your spouse’s total income in the last month before taxes 
and other deductions approximately?’. Open response.
6 Question asked: ‘Over the past five years or so, have you worked together with people who shared 
the same concern?’. Response categories were yes or no.
7 Question asked: ‘Where would you place yourself  on this scale?’ (…on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means the left and 10 means the right).
8 Information about age registered from sample.
9 Information about gender registered from sample.
10 Question asked: ‘How many children 17 or younger are in your household?’. Open question.
11 Question asked: ‘What is your marital status?’. Responses are coded into 1=married/living as mar-
ried and 0=else. 
12 The respondents are divided into five groups, with only one group that assigned the government 
more responsibility than the mean on the scale. This is because the distribution is negatively skewed, 
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with a mean of  8.1 and st. dev. of  2.1, on a scale from 0 (no responsibility) to 10 (a lot of  responsi-
bility). 
13 Household income is divided into five evenly distributed quintiles, and the predicted probabilities in 
Figures 1 and 2 are computed using the mean of  each quintile. 
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